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RECENT DECISIONS
ToRTS--Charitable Immunity-The long-settled doctrine of chari-
table immunity for hospitals was abolished by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
Flagiello v. The Pennsylvania Hospital -..----- Pa - -------- - - - A.2d
........ (1965).
The death knell for the charitable immunity doctrine in Pennsylvania
has finally rung.' In a 5-2 decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has decided that tort immunity shall no longer be accorded to
hospitals as "charities" when the recipients of their "charity" are
injured through the tortious behavior of hospital employees.
In Flagiello, a paying patient of the defendant hospital, alleging
negligence on the part of two employees, instituted a trespass ac-
tion against the hospital and the negligent employees. The hospital
moved for a judgment on the pleadings which, because of the
charitable immunity doctrine, was granted. The plaintiff then in-
stituted an action in assumpsit, alleging that the hospital failed to
provide fit and adequate care as promised. Again, a motion by the
hospital for a judgment on the pleadings was granted and the plain-
tiff then appealed both causes of action to the supreme court.
2
In a lengthy and well-considered opinion by Justice Michael A.
Musmanno, the majority of the court cited four considerations for
1. See The Charitable Immunity Doctrine in Pennsylvania: Death Knell,
3 DUQUESNE U. L. REv. 65 (1964) where a discussion of the legal arguments
raised in Flagiello was presented and where a prediction was made as to the
future of charitable immunity in Pennsylvania, based upon the past voting rec-
ords of the present Justices.
It was predicted that with the change in court personnel resulting from the
losses of Chief Justice Calvin Jones and Justice Curtis Bok and the election of
Justices Henry X. O'Brien and Samuel J. Roberts that the court, when again con-
fronted with the doctrine, would abolish it by a vote of 5-2. In fact, it was pre-
dicted that the two dissenters would be Chief Justice John C. Bell and Justice
Benjamin Jones who did in fact dissent in the present case.
2. It should be noted that the issue of actual negligence on the part of the
defendants has not as yet been adjudicated, and the case has been remanded for
such a determination. However, for purposes of the court's determination of the
legal issues involved, all averments in the complaint were accepted as true.
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abolishing the charitable imunity doctrine as to hospitals. These
are: (1) that the ancient rule that charitable institutions are not
required to recompense patients who have been injured through their
employee's negligence is no longer applicable to modern life; (2)
that the rule of stare decisis is not so stiff and unyielding as to re-
quire blind adherence to archaic rules of law; (3) that the doctrine
must be overruled, not by the legislatures, but by the courts who
sired and coddled it; and (4) that public policy no longer requires
that the doctrine be maintained.
As to the first consideration, the court pointed out that "[i]f
there was any justification for the charitable immunity doctrine
when it was first announced, it has lost that justification today."' 3
History has shown that only the indigent sought treatment in the
small, poorly equipped hospitals of a century ago, the rich preferring
the better facilities of their own homes. Secondly, hospitals were
formerly supported solely by the beneficence of private donors. These
points lead courts to protect these true charities who funneled aid
from rich benefactors to the poor who could not afford medical care.
The court explained, however, that modern hospitals are "big busi-
ness" in the fullest sense of the term.4 No longer are they havens
for the poor and homeless where "[c] harity in the biblical sense pre-
vailed." 5 Today, they are for rich and poor alike, both of whom pay
substantial fees for hospital services. Hospitals as business estab-
lishments must shoulder the responsibilities placed upon other busi-
ness establishments. The court said,
And if a hospital functions as a business institution, by
charging and receiving money for what it offers, it must be
a business establishment also in meeting obligations it in-
curs in running that establishment. One of those inescap-
able obligations is that it must exercise a proper degree of
care for its patients, and, to the extent that it fails in that
care, it should be liable in damages as any other commercial
firm would be liable. 6
Finally, the court stated that it would no longer refuse to con-
sider what was happening in the rest of the legal world, referring to
the fact that charitable immunity is a dying concept with few courts
clinging to this vestige of the past. In support of this the court
3. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital -. ....... Pa ......... ........ A.2d ........ (1965).
4. See 38 Amer. Hosp. Ass'n. J. 492 (Aug. 1, 1964); 37 Amer. Hosp. Ass'n.
J. 440 (Aug. 1, 1963), Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 1963 13 (Health
Ins. Institute, N.Y. 1963).
5. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, supra note 3 at .................
6. Id. at .............
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cited case law,7 the Restatements of Trusts and Torts,8 and various
legal scholars who had been advocating the end of the immunity
doctrine for many years.9
The stare decisis argument was easily disposed of by the court
which stated that this principle did not require it to adhere ad
infinitum to a doctrine which was "manifestly out of accord with
modern conditions of life."' 1 0 To demonstrate this, the court cited
several recent decisions" in which it broke precedent to prevent
injustice and to pronounce a new rule of law more compatible with
modern times.
In connection with the stare decisis argument the court pointed
out that the charitable immunity doctrine, as established in Penn-
sylvania and in the United States, was based upon judicial error
as the case relied upon to establish the doctrine was overruled in
England twenty-two years before Pennsylvania adopted it.12 This,
then, justified the court in finding that ".... the immunity doctrine
began in error, lifted its head in fallacy, and climbed to its shaky
heights only because few dared to question whether charity was
really charity."13
The most persuasive reason for not overruling the doctrine was
that the necessary change should have originated with the legisla-
ture, where its effect would have been prospective rather than
retrospective and all the problems attendant to retroactive change
would have been avoided. However, the court fashioned this doctrine
and what it assembled, the court said, it could and should disassemble.
As far as the problems involved in retroactive change, such as the
flood of litigation resulting from past torts, the court appeared ready
to accept them. After balancing the need for immediate change
7. Parker v. Port Huron Hospital, 361 Michigan 1 (1960); Bing v. Thunig,
2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §402 (1959); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §887
(1939).
9. PROSSER, TORTS §127 (3rd. ed. 1964); 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS 1667 (1956).
10. Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv.
L. R. 409, 414 (1924).
11. Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1 (1964); Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corporation v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95 (1964); Sinkler v. Kneale,
401 Pa. 267 (1960).
12. The courts of the various jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, had
generally relied upon the case of Feoffees of Heriots Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F.
506 (1846) as legal justification for the establishment of the doctrine in the
United States. This case, however, had been previously overruled in England by
the case of Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L. R. 1, H. L. 93 (1866).
13. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, supra note 3 at .............
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against the problems just mentioned, the court decided in favor of
the former. As it said ". . . what follows in the wake of a judgment
cannot be determinative of the issue as to whether law and justice
dictate that judgment."'14
The final consideration as to public policy is, in reality, inclusive
of all previous arguments. In addition, however, the court felt that
the burden of liability would result in greater efficiency and safety
in hospitals because of the increased care hospitals would demand
of its personnel. The court found no credence to the proposition that
the elimination of this doctrine would lead to an increase in the num-
ber of accidents in hospitals due to intentionally inflicted wounds by
patients wishing to "cash-in" on the new non-immunity rule. "[N]o
sane person would prefer money as to a sane and healthy body, free
of pain, agony, and torment."'16 Nor would the new rule create
financial havoc, as hospital administrators forewarned, because there
was no evidence of any such financial catastrophe in states where
the doctrine had been discarded. Neither was there evidence sub-
mitted that the abolition of the 'old rule would reduce donations to
our great medical centers,' 6 for ". . . why should they [philanthro-
pists] refuse to contribute because of an expense which is as much
a part of American civilization as providing assistance for those
struck down by the cruel hand of Abject Poverty?"' 71 Finally, the
court felt that it is one of the basic characteristics of our advanced
society that for every wrong inflicted there is a corresponding
remedy.1 8 Hospitals, the court declared, should adhere to this con-
cept in the same manner as all other individuals.
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court removed hospitals from
the circle of protected charities. With this decision, there can be
no argument. The time was right and the court advanced in the
proper direction. The only possible criticism that can be leveled at
the tribunal is that the step taken was much too small. If it desired
to finally abolish the charitable immunity doctrine, it should have
done so in toto. As Justice Benjamin Jones stated in his dissenting
14. Id. at ...............
15. Id. at .............
16. "There is not the slightest indication that donations are discouraged
or charities crippled in states which deny immunity." 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS 1670 (1956).
17. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, supra note 3 at .............
18. Chief Justice Bell, in his dissenting opinion, vociferously argued against
this proposition stating that it was ". . . both factually and legally incorrect."
In support, he cited the example of sovereign immunity, fair comment in the
area of libel, and the state's inability to appeal the clearly erroneous decision
of a trial judge in a criminal proceeding. Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital,
supra note 3 at .............
(Vol. 3: P. 265
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opinion, "If the doctrine is to be abolished, reason and common sense
dictate that the doctrine should be abolished as to all charitable in-
stitutions .. ."19 Abolishing it only as to hospitals will require
periodic pronouncements as to the liability of each class of charities.
This piecemeal determination of such an important issue can only de-
lay the inevitable-the total destruction of the doctrine. Therefore,
though the court has rung the death knell for charitable immunity
once, the incompleteness of its ruling will require that the bell be
tolled again and again.
IRVING M. PORTNOY
FRANK A. MYsLIwIEc
CONFLICT OF LAws-Torts should be governed by the local law of the
state which has the most significant relationship with the occur-
rence and the parties.
Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
For over 100 years the law of Pennsylvania has been clearly
settled, namely, the substantive rights of the parties, as well
as the damages recoverable are governed by the law of the
place of the wrong or as it is sometimes expressed, the law
of the place where the injury occurred- lex loci delicti:
[citing cases].1
Thus begins the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice John C. Bell, Jr.
in Griffith v. United Airlines, 2 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court abandons this choice of law rule established in Pennsylvania
as early as 1830. 3 The majority of the court replaces this conflict
of law with one which holds that ". . . torts should be governed by
the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and the parties .... -4
On July 11, 1961, after purchasing a round-trip ticket from United
Airlines (United) in Philadelphia, George H. Hambrecht, a Penn-
19. See Jones' dissenting opinion in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital,
supra note 3 at ............. & n  1.
1. Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 26, 203 A.2d 796, 809 (1964). (dis-
senting opinion of Bell, C.J.).
2. Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
3. Barclay v. Thompson, 2 Pen. & W. 148 (1830).
4. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1964).
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